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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the Court of Appeals err in failing to consider 
Plaintiffs1 claims regarding the illegality of Defendants1 conduct? 
2. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs' 
appeal of the trial courts1 denial of Plaintiffs1 Motion to Amend 
the Pleading to Conform to the Evidence and for a new trial on the 
issues of mistake and illegality? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals err in denying Plaintiffs1 
appeal on the issue of whether the trial judge improperly based his 
decision on his physical inspection of the property at or around 
the time of trial where the appearance of the property at that time 
differed greatly from its appearance at the time the alleged 
misrepresentations occurred? 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 34, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure (1990) 
Rule 8(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990) 
Rule 9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990) 
Rule 15(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990) 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1990) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs are appealing the Court of Appeals1 Order of 
Affirmance, in which it affirmed: (1) the trial court's judgment 
awarding damages to Defendants for Plaintiffs' default in payments 
to Defendants on a Promissory Note, allowing Defendants to 
judicially foreclose on the Trust Deed securing such payments, and 
denying Plaintiff's claims for relief; and (2) the trial court's 
subsequent denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and to 
amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
In March 1979, Defendants Martin S. and Reva S. Ovard 
purchased two one-acre lots, a "front" lot and a "back" lot, from 
Layne Newman. (Trial Transcript (hereinafter "Tr.") 58, Trial 
Exhibits (hereinafter "Ex.") 12-D and 13-D). The transactions were 
executed by two separate trust deeds, each covering one acre, (Tr. 
222). The two lots were purchased for a total of $58,000 and were 
closed at separate times (Tr. 206-07, 215, Ex. 21-D). 
The lots were part of a subdivision plan of Mr. Newman, 
encompassing five one-acre lots just north of 650 East 13800 South, 
Draper, Utah (Tr. 58, 61, 206). However, the subdivision plan was 
not approved by the City of Draper (Tr. 60). As a consequence, a 
variance was applied for and granted by the City of Draper so that 
the Ovard's could build a home on the front lot (Tr. 60-61, Ex. 7-
P) . The Ovard fs request was accompanied by a map showing both lots 
(Tr. 61, Ex. 6-P) . The Ovard's then built a home on the front lot, 
intending to live there (Tr. 64-65). Before they could move in, 
the Ovard's ran into financial trouble and sold the house and the 
2 
front lot to a Mr. Nipco (Tr. 66) . The Ovard's also received money 
from Mr. Ovard's parents, Defendants Ben and Helen Ovard, and put 
Ben and Helen Ovard's name on the deed to the back acre so that 
they could recover their money by sale of the lot (Tr. 65-66, 216) . 
Mr. Nipco subsequently ran into financial troubles and sold the 
house and the front acre to Plaintiffs in July 1982 (Tr. 67, 151). 
In April 1982, Defendants Ovard decided to list the back acre 
for sale with Alan Whipple, a realtor (Tr. 224) . In September 
1982, Plaintiffs noticed activity on the back acre and concluded 
that it might be sold (Tr. 152). Plaintiffs feared that someone 
would buy the lot, build on it, and obstruct Plaintiffs1 view from, 
and enjoyment of, their property (Tr. 153). Plaintiffs did not 
want anyone to build on the back acre (Tr. 119-120, 185) , and 
contacted their own realtor, Fred Hale, to discuss buying the 
adjoining back lot in order to prevent someone from building on it 
(Tr. 153, 155). Mr. Hale and Plaintiffs then prepared an offer of 
purchase, and Mr. Hale subsequently presented the offer to 
Defendants (Tr. 120). 
On September 18, 1982, Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into 
an Earnest Money Agreement, pursuant to which Defendants agreed to 
sell and Plaintiffs agreed to purchase the back acre for $26,000 
(R. 201) . On November 8, 1982, Plaintiffs delivered and Defendants 
received and recorded a Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Note") in the 
amount of $25,900, with interest at 15% per annum payable on 
January 15, 1984, and $25,900 principal, plus then accrued 
interest, payable on November 15, 1985 (R. 201). 
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Prior to closing of the sale between Plaintiffs and Defen-
dants, Plaintiffs did not request and Defendants did not offer 
information concerning a variance on the property or the validity 
of the subdivision map (R. 202). Subsequent to the closing, 
Plaintiffs learned that the back lot would require a variance, 
similar to the variance previously granted to Defendants, before 
the City of Draper would issue a building permit on the back lot 
(Tr. 168). 
Plaintiffs1 only payment to Defendants under the Note has been 
an interest payment of $5000 made on March 1, 1984 (R. 202) . 
Plaintiffs did not make the balloon payment that was due on January 
15, 1985, and stated that they would not pay it (R. 202, Tr. 213). 
Defendants then attempted a non-judicial trust deed foreclosure, 
which was enjoined by Plaintiffs (R. 203). 
Plaintiffs filed this fraud * action in Third District: court: 
and Defendants counterclaimed to foreclose the Trust Deed. The 
matter was tried on October 26 and 27, 1987, before the Honorable 
Frank G. Noel. During the course of the trial, Plaintiffs moved 
to amend their pleadings to conform to what they claimed was 
evidence of mutual mistake of fact (Tr. 200), which was a claim and 
issue not contained in Plaintiff's Complaint (R. 2-18). The Court 
reserved ruling on this motion (Tr. 204). Plaintiffs did not renew 
this motion during the remainder of or at the end of trial. 
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At the close of trial, the trial judge asked if either party 
objected if he went and viewed the property. Both counsel for 
Plaintiffs and counsel for the Defendants stated they had no 
objection (Tr. 264) . Judge Noel then took the matter under 
advisement (Tr. 264) . 
On December 4, 1987, the court issued a memorandum opinion, 
finding in favor of Defendants on their counterclaim, and finding 
no cause of action on Plaintiffs1 claim (R. 142-43). Plaintiffs 
thereafter filed a Motion for New Trial and to Amend the Pleadings 
to Conform to the Evidence, this time to assert claims of 
illegality and unilateral mistake (R. 216-217, 227-229). These 
motions were denied (R. 256), and Plaintiffs appealed. 
On March 14, 1990, counsel for the parties presented oral 
argument to a panel of the Utah Court of Appeals. A decision was 
rendered that same day, denying Plaintiffs' appeal. Plaintiffs now 
seek a Writ of Certiorari and review of that decision. 
REASONS WHY THE CASE SHOULD NOT BE REVIEWED 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 46, UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FOR THE GRANTING OF 
PLAINTIFFS1 PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI. 
Plaintiffs assert that this Court should exercise jurisdiction 
to review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, pursuant to 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. That Rule lists 
four reasons for granting a Writ of Certiorari which, "while 
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be 
considered." Those reasons include: 
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(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision in conflict with a decision of 
another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue 
of law; 
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided a question of state or federal law in a way that 
is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
rendered a decision that has so far departed from the 
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has 
so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as 
to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of 
supervision; or 
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an 
important question of municipal, state, or federal law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by the Supreme 
Court. 
None of these reasons exist in Plaintiffs' Petition. As the 
following arguments illustrate, the trial court's decisions are 
completely consistent with Utah statutory and case law. There is 
no conflict between the trial court's or Court of Appeals' 
decisions, as compared with other decisions rendered by this Court 
or by the Court of Appeals, or with the laws of the State of Utah. 
Nor are there any special and important reasons to grant 
Plaintiffs' Petition. The Court of Appeals recognized this, in 
light of its disposition of this case the same day that it was 
heard, pursuant to a Rule 31, Utah R. App. P., proceeding. 
For these reasons, the requirements of Rule 46 are not met, 
and this Court must deny Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
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II. THE EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF DEFENDANTS1 ALLEGED 
ILLEGALITY WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY A REVERSAL OF 
THE TRIAL COURT AND A NEW TRIAL. 
To avoid a contractual obligation by claiming illegality, an 
appellant must show clearly and unequivocally that the contract is 
illegal. Mitchell v. American Savings and Loan Association, 593 
P.2d 692, 694 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979). Plaintiffs cannot show that 
the contract between Plaintiffs and Defendants was illegal, and 
have misconstrued the application of the illegality defense. 
The illegality defense applies to contracts which are 
themselves prohibited by law or contrary to public policy. See 
Williams v. Continental Life and Accident Co., 593 P.2d 708 (Idaho 
1979); Greer v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 674 P.2d 1257 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1984). Plaintiffs have argued that the contract 
in question is itself prohibited by law or contrary to public 
policy, and cite two statutes to that effect. This argument fails 
for several reasons. 
First, Defendants1 basic premise of illegality, i.e., the 
illegal division of land, is unfounded, as the record clearly shows 
that the land was divided into two one-acre parcels when Defendants 
initially purchased the land (Tr. 58, 222; Ex. 12-D and 13-D). 
Defendants merely sold the land to Plaintiffs in the same manner 
that they had bought it, unaware that such a transaction might be 
called "illegal." 
7 
Second, Plaintiffs cite §§ 57-5-3, -5 and 10-9-26, Utah Code 
Ann. (1953 as amended) , in an attempt to show that the sale of land 
by Defendants to Plaintiffs was illegal, thereby subjecting 
Defendants to civil liability. This Court addressed that argument 
in Ellis v. Hale, 373 P.2d 382 (Utah 1962). There, faced with 
facts surprisingly similar to those in the present case, the Court 
stated as follows: 
Plaintiffs argue that the defendants, in selling the 
lots, violated the provisions of ... our state 
statutes.... [citing§ 57-5-5, U.C.A. 1953] However, the 
laws here have as their object the intelligent and 
orderly development of the community, and, to effectuate 
this purpose, criminal sanctions were imposed. They were 
not enacted to promote safety, and they do not attempt 
to lay down rules regulating the conduct of individuals 
inter se. Their purpose is to impose a duty running to 
the sovereign, and a violation thereof does not 
necessarily give rise to civil liability. 
Id. at 384 (emphasis added). 
Based on the reasoning in Kale, Luis Court should not allow 
Plaintiffs to attack their contract based on an alleged violation 
of state statutes by Defendants, when, even assuming such a 
violation, it does not give rise to civil liability. 
Third, Plaintiffs must convince this Court to allow them to 
raise the issues of illegality for the first time on appeal, since 
they did not raise them in their Complaint, and the trial court did 
not allow such issues to be heard. Plaintiffs cite two cases in 
other jurisdictions, which state that when an important public 
policy is concerned, illegality may be raised for the first time 
on appeal. See Mitchell and Greer, supra. 
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An important public policy does not exist in this case to 
allow Plaintiffs to raise the issue of illegality- This Court in 
Hale recognized that, by stating that a violation of the "lot" 
statutes did not give rise to civil liability. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY PLAINTIFFS1 MOTION TO 
AMEND THE PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT 
BE DISTURBED 
When issues not formally raised in the pleadings are tried by 
the express or implied consent of the parties, Rule 15(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 15(b)") allows the 
amendment of the pleadings. That the issue has been tried by the 
consent of the parties must be evident from the record. Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citations omitted). 
Further, it must "appear that the parties understood the evidence 
was to be aimed at the unpleaded issue." Xd. at 785. 
a. The trial court's decision to deny plaintiff's motion 
was within the sound discretion of the court. 
This court has stated that there is a mandatory requirement 
to allow a party to amend its pleadings to conform to the evidence 
when issues are tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties. Lloyd's Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 
P.2d 507, 509 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, the question of 
whether the issues have been sufficiently tried, and thus the 
ultimate decision as to whether the amendment should be allowed, 
remains in the sound discretion of the court. Stratford v. Morgan, 
689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983). Implied consent to try an issue may be 
found where there is no objection to introduction of supporting 
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evidence by an opposing party, and where it appears that the 
opposing party understood that such evidence was aimed at an 
unpleaded issue. In any event, the opposing party must have had 
a fair opportunity to defend and introduce evidence. See Colman, 
supra at 785. 
In the present case, Plaintiffs have not shown that the denial 
of the Rule 15(b) motion was a clear abuse of discretion. To do 
so, Plaintiffs have to show that they sufficiently tried the issues 
of illegality and mistake. Plaintiffs cite Colman to show that 
they have done so. However, the issue in Colman, that of alter 
ego, was "fully tried," and evidence concerning "every element" was 
introduced without objection. Colman, supra at 785. 
Any claimed evidence of illegality or unilateral mistake 
introduced by Plaintiffs in the instant case would also support 
Plaintiffs' claim of fraud. Plaintiffs1 counsel even acknowledged 
and argued such fact with respect to mistake (Tr. 241-243). 
The mere introduction of claimed evidence of mistake did not 
therefore place Defendants on notice that it was aimed at unpleaded 
issues of mistake as is required by Colman, supra. The motion of 
Plaintiffs1 counsel at trial (Tr. 200-204) to amend their pleading 
to assert mistake was the first act that could be argued to have 
placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiffs were asserting or 
relying on a claim of mistake. Defendants immediately objected to 
such motion (Tr. 200) . 
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Any introduction by Plaintiffs of claimed evidence of 
illegality likewise supported Plaintiffs1 claims of fraud and did 
not place Defendants on notice that such evidence was aimed at a 
claim of illegality. Plaintiffs did not move to amend their 
pleadings to assert illegality during trial when such a motion was 
made as to mistake (Tr. 200-204), but such motion was made after 
trial and after judgment had been entered (R. 210-214, 216-17). 
Because Defendants were without notice that Plaintiffs were 
introducing evidence aimed at mistake and illegality at the time 
that the alleged evidence of such theories was introduced, any 
alleged trial of such issues was not with actual or implied consent 
of Defendants and was inadvertent. Defendants did not therefore 
have fair opportunity to defend. This was so, especially with 
respect to the motion on illegality which was not made until after 
trial and after formal judgment was entered. Plaintiffs have 
therefore not satisfied the requirements set forth in Colman. 
b. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead illegality. 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
a party must affirmatively set forth the affirmative defense of 
illegality. In their Petition, Plaintiffs point to page 60 of the 
Trial Transcript to support their argument that illegality was 
sufficiently raised at trial. (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
5) . However, there is nothing on that page or in any section of 
the record which states that Defendants1 actions were illegal. 
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At trial, Plaintiffs merely alleged that Defendants1 division 
of the land is subject to land use regulations (Tr. 17, 19 & 23). 
The only time at trial where illegality was conceivably argued 
concerns arguments of counsel during an objection at trial (Tr. 
175, 178-79). However, these sections of the Trial Transcript are 
not evidence and cannot be considered in determining whether 
Plaintiffs pleaded illegality. 
The defense of illegality does not apply to this case. Even 
if this court finds that it does, Plaintiffs did not sufficiently 
plead it at trial. 
c. Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead mistake. 
When Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, they argued 
that a mutual mistake of fact had been made, and attempted to 
support that allegation (Brief of Appellants, p. 9). Plaintiffs 
again raise that argument in their Petition, but this time fail to 
support it at all (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 7). 
Rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that 
"all averments of . . . mistake shall be stated with particularity." 
The nature of mistake ultimately relied upon by Plaintiffs is 
unilateral mistake (R. 227-229), and their brief focuses only on 
the mistake of Plaintiff Joseph Sanders. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the elements that must be 
established under unilateral mistake: 
(1) The mistake must be of so grave a consequence that 
to enforce the contract as actually made would be 
unconscionable. 
(2) The matter as to which mistake was made must relate 
to a material feature of the contract. 
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(3) Generally the mistake must have occurred notwith-
standing the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake. 
(4) It must be possible to give relief •.. without 
serious prejudice to the other party except the loss of 
his bargain. In other words, it must put him in statu 
[sic] quo. 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). 
Using the same analysis as the Briggs court, even if Plain-
tiffs1 evidence is viewed favorably to them, it is still deficient 
as to at least one element, i.e. , the exercise of ordinary dili-
gence. Id. The trial court concluded that "Plaintiffs failed to 
exercise due diligence at the time of purchase to determine the 
status of the Property," and that "under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted that 
there may be access problems . .. that should have been investi-
gated." (R. 205-06) Therefore, Plaintiffs have not met their 
burden of sufficiently pleading unilateral mistake. 
d. Plaintiffs have not marshalled the evidence, but rather 
have only recited the facts that favor their side. 
Under Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an "appellant 
must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial courtfs findings 
are so lacking in support as to be x against the clear weight of the 
evidence,1 thus making them xclearly erroneous.1" In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In Bartell. a widowed spouse 
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appealed from a finding that she had been omitted from her deceased 
husband's will. As in Bartell, Plaintiffs in this case have 
not even attempted to marshal the evidence in support of 
the trial court's findings, nor [have they] attempted to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings are against 
the clear weight of the evidence, as required by Walker. 
Instead, [they] have essentially reargued the factual 
case submitted below, construing all evidence in a light 
most favorable to [their] case and largely ignoring the 
evidence supportive of the trial court's findings. 
Id. 
Because the question of whether Plaintiffs sufficiently plead 
the issues of mistake and illegality is a question of fact, and 
because Plaintiffs did not marshal the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings, this Court must "rely heavily on the 
presumption of correctness that attends [the trial court's] 
findings," and affirm its judgment. Id. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S VIEWING OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS 
PROPER. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial judge erred in viewing the 
property in dispute because, in doing so, he relied on extrinsic 
evidence gathered at the viewing to find in favor of Defendants. 
Plaintiffs' contention is based on conjecture and speculation and 
is without merit, as they have read misguided and unsupported 
interpretations into the trial judge's conclusions of law. 
A decision by the court to view the property in a dispute 
rests within the sound discretion of the court. 0'Connor v. Dory 
Corp., 381 A.2d 559 (Conn. 1977). The purpose of such a viewing 
"is to assist in interpreting and resolving differences in evi-
dence," rather than to supply evidence totally lacking. Weber 
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Basin Water Conservancy District v. Moore. 272 P. 2d 176, 177 (Utah 
1954) . At trial in this case, conflicting evidence was presented 
as to whether a cul-de-sac existed at the time Defendants purchased 
the property in dispute (Tr. 62, 172). Plaintiffs allege that no 
cul-de-sac existed at the time they purchased the property, and 
that the conditions of the property have changed dramatically since 
that time. However, the Affidavits of neighboring residents 
submitted by Defendants state that the area is virtually identical 
now to what it was at the time the Plaintiffs purchased the 
property (R. 238-39, 242-44). The only changes have been the 
installation of a cement gutter around the cul-de-sac, not to 
define the cul-de-sac, but to control water run-off; the planting 
of shrubs and plants on private property near the cul-de-sac; and 
the installation of a cement wall on the front of private property 
which adjoins the cul-de-sac (R. 239, 243-44) . None of these 
changes have caused the property to change dramatically in appear-
ance. 
After viewing the property at the conclusion of the trial, the 
trial court stated in its Memorandum Opinion that: 
after having viewed the property, that due to the 
location of the property, the road leading from the main 
paved road ending in what appears to be somewhat of a 
cal-de-sac [sic], and under the totality of the cir-
cumstances, a reasonable person should have been alerted 
that there may be access problems associated with the 
back parcel that should be investigated. 
(R. 142-43, 205-06). Plaintiffs have not shown that any of these 
factors considered by the trial judge did not exist at the time 
they purchased the property in question. 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals has dealt with this issue in a 
similar case. In Thomas v. National State Bank, 628 P.2d 188 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981), there was a dispute as to whether a house 
had been negligently constructed. Defendants contended that the 
trial court had erred in allegedly basing one of its findings in 
part on its viewing of the premises. The trial court had announced 
at the end of trial that it wished to view the property and 
received no objection from counsel. In finding for the plaintiff, 
the trial court stated, "This [the finding for the Plaintiff] is 
apparent both from the topographical map [introduced into evidence 
by defendants] and from a view of the premises which the court made 
. . . .
If
 Id. at 190 (quoting trial court). The court of appeals 
stated that under these circumstances, defendants1 argument was 
without merit. Id. (citations omitted). 
Defendants are merely speculaLing when they allege that the 
trial court relied heavily on his viewing. The trial court in fact 
dispelled that notion in its Order Denying Motions for New Trial 
and to Amend the Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence, when it 
stated that its viewing of the property in question was not of 
primary importance to its decision (R. 255-256). Even if it did 
put some reliance on the viewing, its reliance was proper, as it 
was only to assist in resolving differences in the evidence already 
presented. 
Finally, the trial court's viewing of the property was agreed 
to by both Plaintiffs and Defendants (Tr. 264) . After such 
agreement and failure to object to the viewing prior to its 
16 
occurrence, and after being given the opportunity by the trial 
court to object, Plaintiffs1 later objection is precluded and 
without merit. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
The promissory note sued upon by Defendants provides for 
attorney's fees to Defendants upon default by Plaintiffs in payment 
of the same (Exhe 2-P) . Defendants should therefore be awarded 
attorney's fees and costs on this appeal, with the amount thereof 
to be determined by the trial court upon remand for that purpose. 
In addition, if this Court refuses to grant Plaintiffs' 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Defendants should be granted their 
costs in opposing Plaintiffs' Petition, pursuant to Rule 34, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants ask this court to deny Plaintiff's Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari for several reasons. First, Plaintiffs have not 
met any of the requirements of Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. Second, 
the evidence on the issue of defendants' alleged illegality was not 
sufficient to justify a reversal of the trial court and a new 
trial, nor does such alleged illegality give rise to civil 
liability. Third, the trial court's refusal to allow Plaintiffs 
to amend their pleadings to conform to the evidence was within the 
court's discretion, as Plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead 
illegality or mistake, and Plaintiffs have failed to marshal the 
evidence to show otherwise. Finally, the trial court's viewing of 
17 
the property in dispute was proper, and its subsequent decision was 
based on evidence in the record. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants ask that this Court deny Plaintiffs1 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and award Defendants their fees 
and costs in opposing the same, 
DATED this / W o day of May, 1990. 
CROWTHER & REED 
'Thomas N. Crowther 
/ 
/ 
Michael L. Labertew 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE UF bhKVlCE 
Four copies of the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Writ of 
Certiorari were mailed in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, 
to Plaintiffs1 Attorney, Frederick N. Green, at GREEN & BERRY, 528 
Newhouse Building, 10 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this ~< day of May, 1990. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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MAR 1 ;>;fC?3 
lifer C *„.»** -
Joseph D. Sanders and Cheryl M. 
Sanders, 
Plaintiff and Appellants, 
v. 
Martin S. Ovard, Reva S. Ovard, 
Ben F. Ovard, Helen T. Ovard 
and Jax Hayes Pettery, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
v. 
Joseph D. Sanders, Cheryl M. 
Sanders; Utah State Tax 
Commission; Salt Lake 
County; and Insurance Company 
of North America, 
Counterdefendants• 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 890063-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson (on Rule 31 
Hearing). 
The judgment and findings of the trial court are 
supported by the evidence and the record before the trial 
court. Also, there was no abuse of discretion in refusing to 
allow plaintiff's amendment. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Dated~this / y ^ f f a y of March, 1990. 
/ / 
FOR THE COURT:; 
<^_ 
Regna 1 to^Ua&iT'Jufqi'/lr^' 
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Ronald Dean Lancaster, pro se. der when the prosecution was unable to 
David L WilkiQSOii, Kimberfy Honuk, prove the aggnvating circumstaaces with 
Salt Lake Qty, for defendants ud rtspon- which hehad been charged. In his habeta 
:~u corpus petiticm, plaintiff a^ears to allege 
PERCURIAlt tionai murder^  ud that he should han 
Plaintiff M,h propria permi, a pe- h o sentenced to one to fifteen je t f 
tition for poateonviction relief in the trial imprisonment mstead of five years to fife, 
court with respect to his guilty plea to and Plaintiff stated that he was innocent of 
subsequent conviction of second degree knowingly and intentionally committing; tie 
murder. I k trial court dismissed the peti- offense and was therefore unlawfully & 
tin as inappropriate, as plaintiff had not prisoned and that he had been denied doe 
brought a motion to withdraw his guilty process and effective assistance of coonseL 
plea and a collateral attack under rule 65B fa addition, plaintiff challenged the cooatj. 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was tutionality of the statutes under which he 
therefore not permissible. We reverse and was charged and sentenced. 
n^fe.Mittp.th..*
 m cm to mW ***<!« 
In response to plaintiffi petition, the habeas conras is not a sofotitDte for sad 
State brought a motion to dismiss on the o u ^ ^ ued to perform tite fimetiim of 
ground that ander the rationale of Stofe u
 rep]ir appellate review. Porter uCboi 
m m M M J |309 {Utah 1987), plain-
 w P „ , 1032 (Utah 1987); o S 
Jff was precluded fin banging i motion
 ntMmkm m m m m 
for postconviction reiief unl be had first , „ - , , , « .,, ^
 0(U „M 
. *";. , , , . . . , , . 18ft Martina v. SimtA, 602 Pid 70a 
brought a motion to set aside bis p t y 7Q2/nt«h 1979) Bt'thuahoreflmHtt] 
plea. He trial court adopted that rationale , } . . . . I W P « i 
• u. -1 J J . _* / t v uat review by habew « r p B appropr*. 
ai its oroer deoTinr writ of habeas conwa,
 t . .'. * ™V 
and-theStaterepeata it before Uus Courts *M^ma?miomui* 
cbalknpgtl«nrtofplaintiffshat«as ^tal toessandtoreexanmacc* 
corpus petition. vrton when the nature of the afleged error 
„ ts sach that it would be uncoosdonible oot 
S^ R «^inappos i tehere .Gib . toMBaBta: ChaSw^eUPJirtlllS 
bona pleaded g ^ r to several charges and ^ ^ ^  .% ^ j ^ 
toappeaW irec/y after the tml court
 over(rale65B<i)oftheUtlllRakjof(H U a M t a t o c M t a i | C produre specifically provides that a («• imprisonment He did not file a motion to . r . , , ..,, .,,,. r
 oner who asserts a substantial denial of his his appeal and thi' State arguedlatS constotwiiil nghU my institute a pn^  Court should decline to conaider the gui2t7 ceeding tmder this rule." See abo ^ 
plea issue because it was not raised below, J ^ ^ ^ ^  where tlus Court 
740 P.2d at 131L This Court declined to ^ a petiton for habeas corpus revm 
follow the State's request and remanded ble without fi«t requinng the withdrawal 
thecasetoeiiabteGabonstofikaiiwtion of a guilty plea. Given the allegations 
to withdraw his guilty p]ea, retaining juris- plaintiff made ui his petition, it was there^  
diction over the case for further action, fore error for the trial court to dismiss the 
Stok* GibbmMMtwmtolicoU P ^ 0 wiBwtt ^ a hearin* 
ml attack on the guilty plea. Without the benefit of findings, this 
Conversely here, plaintiff filed a post* Court is in no position to review the ralidh 
conviction petite to challenge the vahdity ty of plaintiffs claims. It is safe to s* 
of his guilty piea some nine years after the some that trial courts prefer to give shof^  
time for a direct appeal had run. Itap- shrift to the many post-conviction petitiaa 
pears from his handwritt^ i pleadings that which they decide lack merit ItisequaSy 
he was originally charged with first degree safe to assume that an appellate court w i 
murder, but pleaded to second degree mar* be unable to review the case in a vacuum] 
LLOYDS JWfflTO) r. MMS WAY Vttt ffl 
and will have to remand it where no ratio- was not precluded from seeking reforms-
sale for dismissal or denial is given. A tin of commission schedule under coo-
siinple finding, on the other hand, will suf- trac^  and (3) middleman was not entitled 
fee in the vast majority of cases to limit to recover costs of deposing two witnesses 
the judicial process to one review. l ie and serving subpoena on one witness. 
tiial cotfflfs basis for dsmissinsr plaintiffs Vacated and remanded 
petition in this ca» was erroneous, as statt-
d The rmci'ss too qmeJor this Oivt 
to determine whethe the issues raised by I Pleading **UKi) 
tbe pleadings were legal, so that it could In breach of contract action in which 
affirm the trial court on the ground that miifanan who sold "coffee e i taykf i^ 
the daims were properly resolved as a mat- act" for supplier sought to recover comma-
ter of law. See Gmla t Morris 610 ska under contract with supplier, trial 
PJd 1285,1286 (Utah 1980). Instead, it court erred in denying mjddkman^  motioa 
appears that piaintiff claims irreguJarity ic to amend to include cause of action for 
the reception of his guilty plea, an issue reformation of contract so the commission 
M should have been considered by the schedules could be changed; issue of co& 
trial court mission schedules wuiwt raised and sec* 
Tie case is remanded for entry of find- ** 1q it tM id art Si rt tin 
ings on the merits. middleoan to submit evidence <m issue <^  
parties' intent in entering contract 
1 Reformation of Instruments o t t 
Middleman who sold "coffee extendi 
product" for supplier was not precluded 
from seeking reformation of commission 
schedule under contract with supplier be-
cause contract included iuiegfttiou clause. 
LLOYD'S UNUMITED, a corporation, 1 f^ormation of Instruments *=»]), 
Plaintiff and Appellant, (81) 
r< Reformation of contract is equitable 
(p {ffrwwmw) 
ity and established by clear and convincing 
proof. 
April 21f 1988. 
NATURE? WAY MARKETING, LTD., 
a corporation, Defendant and 
Respondent 
N t M H U U 4. Costs ^176,193 
In middleman's action against supplier 
Court of Appeals of Utah. to recover commissions under contract witii 
supplier, middleman waa not entitled to re-
cover costs of deposing two witnesses id 
serving subpoena on one witness. Rules 
Middleman brought action for breach Civ.Proc, Rule 54(d). 
of contract against supplier, seeicing ac- j ^ t f l j 
counting and judgment for sums due under „ . ,. , .^
 XL . 
« * TT« IT^ District Court, Salt . ^ * T * " * ! ? * * rf 
Ufa County, Dean I Conder, J., entered J * ^ * S " ^ 
jndpenttofavorofanppiier.ando.iddle. ^ ^ T T ^ " 1 " 1 
. » « * . H»e Court of Appeals, ^ t ^ T ^ 
W i J, held that (1) JZ T 1 ^ ? / 
emd in denying middleman's motioa to m > m i m 
Wnd to include cause of action (or refer- 6. Appeal and Error «998K1) 
•ttion of contract so the commission frial court's man*; on whether to 
«feedaie9 eonid be changed,- (2? zniddfeman sward party tbe costs 0/depositwof is pre-
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sumed correct md will not be disturbed 
unless it is so unreaaraable as to manifest 
dear abuse of discretion. Rules GY-PTOC, 
Rule 54(d). 
Kevin J. Sutterfield (argued), Leslie W. 
Slaagh, Ray& Uartineaa, RC, Provo, for 
plaintiff and appelant 
Terry E (Min (argued), H Wayne 
(or defendant and respondent 
Before GREENWOOD, BILLINGS 
and BENCH, A 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Plaintiff, Lloyd's Unlimited (Lloyd's), ini-
tiated this action against defendant, Na-
ture's Way Marketing, Ltd. (Nature's 
Way), for breach of contract, seeking an 
accounting and judgment for sums due un-
der the contract The court found that the 
parties had entered into a valid and, en-
forceable contract and awarded Lloyd's 
$416.25. Lloyd's appeals, claiming that the 
court improperly denied its motion to 
amend the complaint to include a cause of 
action for reformation and that the trial 
court's findings of fact were clearly errone-
ous, Lloyd's requests modification of the 
lower courf s award and entry of judgment 
against Nature's Way for $39,710.41. Al-
ternatively, Lloyd's requests that the judg-
ment be vacated and the case remanded. 
We reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
In early 1982, Lloyd Dowdle (Dowdle), 
president of Lloyd's, and Lynn Burning-
ham (Burningham), president of Nature's 
Way, began negotiating terms of a contract 
involving a "coffee extender product" 
(product). The contract was to provide 
that Lloyd's would receive a commission 
from Nature's Way for product sold to 
Yurita Foods Corporation (Yurika) by Na-
ture's Way in consideration of Lloyd's ef-
forts in inducing Yurika to purchase and 
market the product In early August 1982, 
Dowdle drafted a handwritten document 
which stated that Lloyd's would receive 
$100 commission for each pound of prod. 
uctsold. On August 11,1982, after Dot. 
die and Burningham discussed the do* 
anient, Dowdle crossed out the commasiQQ 
paragraph he had drafted and inserted a 
new schedule in the handwritten contract 
which, as found by the trial court, prorided 
the following commission schedule: 
1 unit—60 packets pack .25* 
1 unit—2 lb. bulk pack i t 
1 uniW lb. bulk pack 50* 
1 unit—37 lb. bulk pack $100 
The parties then signed the agreemott 
Several days later, Dowdle's secretary 
typed the agreement from the handwritten 
version. The typewritten agreement set 
forth thf same commission schedule as set 
out above except the commission on the 6 
lb. bulk pack was Sk rather than 50t 
The typewritten agreement also repeated 
verbatim the following clause from the 
handwritten agreement "This agreement 
contains the entire understanding of the 
parties hereto and may not be altered, 
amended, modified, or discharged in any 
way whatsoever except by subwHrast 
agreement in writing by all parties hereto," 
The parties then signed the typewritten 
agreement and Nature's Way paid Lloyd's 
$500, representing commission earned from 
April 24,1982 to August 1,1981 Tie 
parties did not make a formal accounting 
of the sizes or amount of the product sold 
to earn the $500 commission. 
Between August 1,1982 and February 
28,1984, Nature's Way received more than 
$625,000 for product sold to Yurika but 
failed to pay any commissions to Lloyd'i 
Subsequently, Lloyd's initiated this action, 
alleging in paragraph 5 of its complaint 
that Nature's Way owed it commissioQi 
based on the following commission sched-
ule: 
60 packets pack $ .25 
2 lb. bulk pack 35 
5 lb. bulk pack JO 
37 lb, bulk pact 1.00 
Nature's Way's answer to paragraph 5 
stated Defendant denies the validity 4l 
the agreement and therefore denies thj 
allegations in paragraph 5 of the Plaintiff^  
complaint to the effect that defendant is? 
*J^**U*!iL 2 * object* P ^ ^ 
1-1{
 ^ t e e s * * * " " ^ evidence. 
**£££*«#*• * oarto to Utah Iflrf. 
t W a l n i M * * " " 0 ^ ^ ^ There are Wo paw « u . 
* • " ? ! i *rvice of .ubpoenaa;
 m u <tfm»^ • ~ 
L KffnON w » » » ' • ^ further pn>™<* -
STih»tatea: . , The Utah Supreme Court » 
^totocoafonntotheer^ | ^ S S i 2 2 g 
.meoddoetnot affect the result of the G2S 
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infl to their dispute. What they are ajti-
tled to is ootice of the issues nised and 
in opportunity to nwet tkm. When this 
is accomplished, that a 4D that is re-
qused. Oar rules pnnride for Sberalitj 
to aOow ezammaticxi into and setUaaent 
of ill issues bearing upon the con trove 
ay, but safeguard the rights of the otter 
party to have a reasonable time to meet a 
net issue if he so requests. 
Accord William 1 State Fm In & , 
656 Pid 966, « W 1 (Utah 1982). 
E Procedural Background 
border to properly assess the validity of 
the trial court's roiings, we must first pro-
vide a rather detailed description of the 
r of this case. 
Hie record reveals that proceedings in 
this matter focused on Lloyd's theory of 
lack of consideration, op until the second 
day of trial As stated earlier, Nature's 
Way's answer to the complaint generally 
denied liability under the contract, without 
specificaily addressing the commission rate 
amounts alleged in the complaint Theas-
swer also included an affirmative defense 
of lack of consideration.' Prior to trial, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment, seeking judgment in the sum of 
$31,545.64 plus accruing interest The mo-
tion was supported by the affidavit of a 
the amount due under the contract utilizing 
the commission schedule as alleged in the 
complaint and invoices of sales made by 
Nature's Way to Yurika. Lloyd's memo-
randum in support of the motion and 
"Statement of Uncontested Facts" again 
set forth the same schedule as in the com-
plaint Nature's Way's memorandum in 
opposition to the motion for summary judg-
ment states 'Defendant has no objection to 
what plaintiff has set out as uncontested 
fads other than that important uncontest-
ed facts were omitted" The memorandum 
then sets forth additional "facts" but does 
not mention the commission rate amounts. 
H e court denied the motion for summary 
During the first day of trial, the parties 
addressed, almost exduanrely, the question 
of what consideration Lloyd's was to pro* 
vide in order to earn the commission 
Burningham testified that he expected 
Dowdk to do a lot of traveling to proo* 
sales for Nature's Way, and that in regarf 
to payment of Dowdk's travel expenses, 
'That's the reason why I offered the c o i 
mission. And I offered that—I offered |: 
to him because it would have been v*y 
lucrative for him."1 
On the second day of trial, Burninghaa 
testified under direct examination as to 
what the contract said, as follows: 
Q. What does it state will be payiblt 
for one unit of the two-pound bulk 
pack? 
A. iScents. 
Q. i 5 cents? 
A. That's correct 
Q. Quarto of a cent, I guess. 
On cross examination, Lloyd's counsel 
began to question Burningham about the 
intent of the parties on the commission rati 
amounts, the trial court sustained Na-
ture's Way's objection to such questioning. 
After trial, but before the court entered: 
its findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
Lloyd's filed a motion for an order grant* 
ing leave to file an amended complaint to 
conform to the evidence to include a cause 
of action for reformation of the contract 
Lloyd's also filed a post trial memorandum 
which included excerpts from the deposi-
tion of Burningham, as follows: 
Q. Had you made commissions to 
Lloyd's... you would pay him 35 
cents for each two pound bulk pack! 
A. Correct 
Q. Based on the 300 figure! 
A. Correct 
Q. For the five pound bulk you would 
pay him 50 cents based on the 180 
figure! 
A. Correct 
Lloyd's also submitted Dowdle's affidavit 
ted dad: 
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p i points eironeously, as was done on at [1] Consequently, we bold that the tii 
lent part of the handwritten agreement court erred in denying the motion to amenf 
> Several months after the trial the court to •** *ttMe rf * * » for refonnatiosr 
^^ifytitovitalk o f i k c o n t r a r t w h e r e t h e i s s w o f ^ 
fcftmBgrttehandwrito sion seheduies was not raised ontfl the 
tntta ov toe nsftiss nad commission rates 
second day of trial sad where the court S t 
i fyfyVk, and JL00; the typed JrtaflotUoyd'stosuI^ 
agreement executed by the parties had issue of tl» parties'intent in entering the 
commoskm rates of i5c, i5c t iOcf and contract Because the motion to amend 
fLOOj and the intent of the parties with should have been granted, we reverse and 
-respect to commissions did not change be- remand for further proceedings on the ref* 
tween execution of the two agreements, ormation issue. 
Farther, the court found that the parties 
had stipulatoi to the amount of pwduct
 a Mnnation of ^ 
sold during the time in question Thecourt 
eoaehided that the typed coixtz3ct was a ft fl We farther note that the trial 
n f i i integrated and enforceable contract « r t * » « * t y W » d t o & * & * & 
andentewdjudgmentforl^iTandcosts ten agreement could no^ as a matter of 
tfi]$jlt law, be reformed, because of the inte-
m. ^ J • 1 .L u
 4 j prion clause included in the contract1 The court denied the motion to amend l f ,. . . . . , u 
..
 A, . . , t , Reformation of a contract is an equitable be complaint to include a cause of action 
For reformation. 
C. Application of Law 
remedy which must be pied with particular-
ity and established by clear and convincing 
proof. Brigg$ a LiddeU, 699 Pid 770,772 
In this case, when, on the second day of (Utah 1985). He Biijgt court stated: 
trial, Burningham first testified that the A contract may be reformed for either of 
two reasons. First if the instrument 
does not embody the intentions of both 
parties to the contract, a mutual mistake 
has occurred, and reformation is appro-
priate. Second, if one party is laboring 
tinder a mistake about a contract term 
and that mistake either has been induced 
by the other party or is known by and 
conceded to by the other party, then the 
inequitable nature of the other party's 
conduct will have the same operable ef-
fect as a mistake, and reformation is 
commission for a sixty pound bulk pack 
wss a quarter of a cent, Lloyd's attorney 
Si not object to the testimony on the 
ground that it was not within the issues 
framed by the pleadings. Therefore, be-
eaase no objection w u raised, we conchide 
that there was implied consent to trying of 
the issui and the first part of Rule 15(b) 
applies, allowing omsaderatkui of the issue. 
On the other hand, Lloyd's had notice of 
the issue of commission rates only on the 
second day of trial, and by the court's 
rulings, had no adequate opportunity to 
meet the issue. We, therefore, also find 
that it wss an abuse of discretion to con- / i at 771 Reformation has also been a^ 
comitantly disallow Lloyd's to respond to plied in instances of drafter error. "Refer-
thenewlyraisedissue,bythecourfsrefus. mation is clearly appropriate where there is 
altoconsiderevidenceofintentanddenial a variance between the written deed and 
of the motion to amend the complaint to the true agreement of the parties caused 
plead reformation of contract flierewas by a draftsman." Hettinger v.Jme% 684 
noevidenaofprejudkewhichwouWre^ P-2d 1271,1273 1984), 
to Nature's Way and, indeed, amendment On remand, the court should allow 
would aDow realization of one of the crite- Lloyd's to present whatever evidence it can 
ria under Rule 15(b)—"presentation of the muster to establish its right to reformation 
merits of the action." of the contract Moreover, it is not pre-
L This tesdmony strikes us 11 incoodstent with 
Nature's Way's contention that the agreement 
*3 
yielded commiisioos of only (41&25 over t v 
time period in question. 
t l i e court may hive believed ref ormation was 
not available for other reasons, but the ante-
fratkm clause was the only rationale mentioned 
by the court 
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eluded from doing so by the integration 
clause included in tie contract An inte-
rior or contemporaneous agreements on 
the same subject, bat "does not prevent 
poof of fraudulent representations by a 
party to the contract, <» of illegality, acci-
dent, or mistake.... [P]aper and ink pos-
sess no magic power to cause statements 
of fact to be tone when they are actually 
untrue" Cor6tn on Conirodx, § 578 at 
405-07(196(1). 
1 COSTS 
[4-6] Lloyd's also contends that the 
court ared in failing to awird it the costs 
of deposing Bnnungham and Webb and 
serving a subpom on Burningliam. Utah 
R.GY.P, 54(d) provides that except as the 
rak otherwise provides, "costs shall be al-
lowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs...." 
The general rule is that under Utah 
M M . 54(d) "costs" means those fees 
wind are '"required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses " fmmpton v. W\l 
tm, 805 P.2d771, 774 (Utah 1980). How-
ever, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that tte expenses of taking depositions are 
also allowable as costs if they were reason-
ably necessary. John Price Amc, Inc. v. 
D m 588 P id 713,715 (Utah 1978). Dep-
osition costs are generally allowed as nec-
essary and reasonable "where the develop-
ment of the case is of such a complex 
nature that discovery cannot be accom-
plished through the less expensive method 
of interrogatories, requests for admissions 
and requests for the production of doc-
uments.'1 Highland Qmitr. Co. v. Union 
Po&lUL, 683 P id 1042,1051 (Utah 1984). 
The party claiming entitlement to the costs 
of depositions has the burden of demon-
strating that the depositions were reason-
ably necessary and whether that burden is 
met is within the sound discretion of the 
trialcourt li; MSecBankofM 
l U t R W n m 563,567 (Utah 
1974). Tie trial court's ruling on whether 
to award a party costs of depositions is 
{ffesnmed correct and will not be distnrbed 
unless it is so unreasonable as to manifest 
a dear abuse of discretion Firtt Sec 
Bank, 521 P id at 567, Tie Utah S 
Court has declined to extend the 
which allows recovery of the cost oft 
adepoeitionftoexpensessuchuserTios^ 
a subpoena, f ramp ton, 605 P i d at T ^ 
Lloyd's claims that the depositions 
Burningham and Webb were essential j 
the development and presentation of tfifj 
case and that Webb's deposition was I 
would be unavailable to testify at teal j»« 
addition, Lloyd's argues that becausep^ 4 
tions 
used at trial, it should be awarded the < 
of Burningham's depositxsL Lloyd's! 
contends that it should have be© an 
the costs of serving Burningham with a* 
subpoena to insure his appearance at the 
deposition Nature's Way had previously 
failed to appear at a hearing on a motion to'' 
compel discovery, and Lloyd's believed that 
the subpoena was necessary to secure 
Burningham's appearance at the deposid 
tion. ' t 
Nature's Way, to the contrary, argues^ 
that because Lloyd's did not use WebbY' 
deposition at trial and did not publish Bury 
ingham's or Webb's deposition at trial, thr 
court properly denied Lloyd's the costs i. 
the deposition. Nature's Way also co* 
tends that Lloyd's could have avoided thi 
cost of the subpoena by telephoning N» 
tore's Way's attorney to see if the corpora 
tion would produce Burningham for a depo^ 
sition, and, therefore, the trial court c * 
rectiy denied Lloyd's the cost incurred ia 
subpoenaing Burningham. 
We find that, in view of these arg** 
ments, the trial court's decision to deny 
Lloyd's the costs of the two deposition 
was reasonable. Apparently, Lloyd's fsibd 
to prove that the deposition costs wen 
reasonably necessary and could not be # 
complished through less expensive meaa^ 
Therefore, because the burden of prog 
was not met and because the trial cocrtV 
decision was reasonable, we hold that Ui 
trial court did not abuse its discrtooo^l 
jyd's the costs of taking. 
3ns. 
1
 i f A T C v . S T U E S Utah m 
re a k hold that the trial court's deci- A^eals held Uiat petition failed to satisfy to deny Lloyd's the cost of subpoena- applicable requirements. 
Burningham was not unreasonable, in 
of Frtmpton, where the court de-
to extend the rules for awarding 
ts to exposes such as service 
and vacated the trial court's 
Petition denied. 
Crisninal U w i»l«71 
Petition for certificate of probable 
i of su(4 costs. Therefore, we hold cause ladced required affidavit of counsel 
0 0 the trial court did not abuse its discre- or memorandum of law supporting defend-
fain refusing to award Lloyd's the costs anfs position that issues presented on ap-
|jerving the subpoena, peal were novel or fairly debatable. 
Bradley P. Rich, Yengith, Rich, X a i x i 
Metos, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
appellant 
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. G a , 
Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty. Gen., k 
plaintiff and respondent 
Before JACKSON, 0RME and 
GREENWOOD, II. (On Law and 
P IIL FINDINGS 
tijtfs third claim of error is that the court's findings are not supported by 
# evidence Because we hold that that 
£ trial court erred in denying the motion 
Baaend, we need not reach the issue of 
lather the findings are supported by the 
ifldence. 
Tie judgment of the trial court is vacat-
id sad the matter remanded for further 
jroeeedmgs in accordance with this opin-
a MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
BILLINGS and BENCH, JJ., concur. This matter is before the court os t 
Petition for Certificate of Probable Cause 
Appellant's counsel filed the petition oo 
March 10,1988. It was accompanied by i 
brief Memorandum of Points and Authori-
ties, but was not supported by the affidavit 
of counsel required by State t Ntciq, 707 
P,2d 647 (Utah 1985). H e Utah Supreme 
Court set forth the rationale for the pro^ 
dure mandated in Nttley as follows: 
The record of proceedings below is not 
available in this Court at the time such 
petitions are brought In addition, the 
petitions filed by the defendants are gen-
erally conciusory and contain little infor-
mation concerning the case. I t e attor-
ney general, who is by law required to 
argue before this Court, is uninformed 
concerning the facts of the case or the 
proceedings taken in the court below and 
therefore finds it difficult to respond to 
petitions for certificates of probable 
cause. This Coart is likewise un-
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Dklde Lynn STUKES, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 88Q154-CA, 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 22,1988. 
^Following ruling of the Third District 
p r t , Summit County, PatB, Brian, J., on 
| t a k issue, defendant filed petition for 
i of probable cause. TheCourtof 
argument In order that this Court may 
make an informed decision in i s s u i n g 
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PhyUit & COLMANt Plaintiff 
tad Respondent, 
?, 
W U H a a l C O L M ^ M e a i a n t 
iBdAppeBnL 
utsma 
Court of Appeth <rf Utah. 
o<nm 
Husband appealed boo order of the 
Had District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David B. Dee, J^ which dmded property in 
connection with divorce, l ta Court of Ap-
peals, Garff, J., held that (1) evidence sus-
tained trial court's determination to pierce 
corporate veil of husband's corporations, 
and (2) distribution was proper. 
Affirmed. 
1. Pleading <*4ff 
If theory of recovery is fully tried by 
the parties, court may base its decision on 
that theory and deem the pleading amend-
ed, even if the theory was not originally 
pleaded or set forth in the pleadings or the 
pretrial order; that the issue has, in fact, 
authorized by the express or implied con-
sent of the parties must be evident from 
the record 
1 Divorce ^ t t t 
Although alter ego issue was not spe-
cifically raised in pleadings, where entire 
over assets in question, the issue was tried 
by the consent of the parties and trial court 
properly based its decision on that issue. 
I Divorce « 5 3 ( 2 ) 
Finding that corporation was hus-
band's alter ego was supported by evidence 
that husband ignored corporate formalities, 
that he referred to the corporation's check-
dealt with corporate assets without suggest-
ing that he was acting on behalf of anyone 
other than himself, that the officers and 
dmrfATf vkvpA littU t* iw ml* in tta 
operation of the corporate entity, that a * 
porate records were not kept, and that the 
husband used the corporation and other 
corporate shells as a facade for his person-
al business operations. 
t C o r p o r a t i o a ^ U l J ) 
Corporate veil which protects stock-
holders from individual fiabifity will be 
pierced only reluctantly and cautiously. 
S,Corporatk»i«»1.4(4) 
To disregard corporate entity under al-
ter ego doctrine, there must be shown such 
a unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the individual no longer exist, and it 
must be shown that, if the corporate form 
were observed, it would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity; 
it is not necessary that plaintiff prove actu-
al fraud but he must show that a failure to 
pierce the corporation veil would result in 
an injustice. 
i Corporations P\Ml) 
Factors which are significant in deter 
mining whether corporate veil shouid be 
pierced are undercapitalization of a one-
man corporation, failure to observe corpo-
rate formalities, nonpayment of dividends, 
siphoning of corporate funds by dominant 
stockholder, ixmfunctioning of other offi-
cers or directors, absence of corporate 
records, use of corporation as a facade or 
operations of the dominant shareholder, 
and use of the corporate entity in promofr 
ing injustice or fraud 
T. Corporations «*1.«1) 
Failure to observe corporate formal 
ties, which may justify pierang corporate 
veil, includes such activities as comment* 
ment of business without the issuance of 
shares, lack of shareholders at directors 
meetings, lack of signing of assents, and 
making of decisions by shareholders u if 
they were partners. 
I Corporations * U ( 1 ) 
Rationale used by courts in permitting 
corporate veil to be pierced is that, if praei* 
pal shareholder or owner conducts his p k 
vate and corporate business on sn intf l^ 
ehMrahk or ioint basis as if thev were ,*. 
COUUNv.COLMAN 
one, he is without standing to complain Frank J. Alien, Salt Lake Qty, for de-
when an injured party does the same, fendant and appellant 
I Divorce t t i l M Bryce Roe, Albert (^Iton, Salt Lake Gty, 
Former spouses attempting to shield ^ P^ti f f and respondent 
assets fimn a court-ordered pn^erty <&tz> 
bution by using a corporate form are espe- Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
da&y looked opcm with judicial disfavor. JACKSON. 
I t Divorce e t S U 
Fact that property distribution may 
not have been mathematically equal b not 
sufficient grounds to constitute an abuse 
of discretion, as fair and equitable propaty 
(Sstriinition is not necessarily an equal dis-
tribution. 
1L Divorce o t t U O ) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
is dnridxng property after piercing corpo-
rate vai on the grounds that the corpora-
tion was the husband's alter ego. 
I I Divorce * t t U ( Q 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in requiring husband to pay an amount 
representing a percentage of the price of 
proceeds from sate of ranch where he 
found that husband held an interest in the 
ranch. 
11 Estoppel *OH) 
Estoppel arises when there is a false 
representation or concealment of material 
facts made with knowledge, actual or con-
structive, of the facts to a party who is 
without knowledge or the means of lcnowi-
edge of the real facts and made with an 
intention that the representation be acted 
qon, and the party to whom the represen-
tation was made relies or acts upon it to his 
prejudice. 
I t E s t o p p e l s 
Estoppel cannot be inferred from facts 
of which party to be estopped had no 
11 Husband and Wife « I K 1 ) 
Fife was not estopped from denying 
that husband had furnished adequate ac-
counting u required by their divorce 
igreeoent even though wife's attorney had 
retaroed certain stock certificates which he 
tad tana) A W tn +ta« 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Defendant/appellant William J. Coiman 
appeals from a property settlement judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff/respondent Phyi-
lis I Coiman stemming from their 1977 
divorce. He seeks revesal of the judg-
ment 
The parties were divorced after a twenty-
four year childless marriage during which 
they acquired substantial property. On 
August 2,1977, in anticipation of divorce, 
they executed a written property settle-
ment agreement Because questions had 
not been resolved as to which assets con-
trolled by defendant were part of the m*& 
tal estate, this agreement required him to 
provide plaintiff with a "complete account-
ing of all stocks currently owned by him or 
in which he [had] any interest," and a 
"complete accounting of all royalty intar-
ests currently owned by him or in which he 
[had] any interest" within one year of the 
agreement Once the extent of defend-
ant's holdings was determined, plaintiff 
was to receive one-half of defendant's in-
terest in any stocks "held i n . . . [his] name 
or in which he [had] any interest," and 
one-half of the sales proceeds of the 
Anderson Ranch, jointly owned property 
located in Cache County, Utah. 
Much of the dispute between the parties 
centered around defendant's relationship to 
Owanah Ofl Corpmtxm [Owanah], a close-
ly held corporation winch defendant and 
Francois de Gonsberg had founded in 1952 
to engage in o9 and gas exploration. De-
fendant had served as Owanah1! president 
during much of the parties'marriage. In 
1959, Owanah was restructured to gener-
ate outside capital As a consequence, de-
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twenty percent of Owanah's outstanding 
shares. 
At the tine of the divorce, defendant 
also controlled stock, originally issued in 
various names, in other closely held corpo-
rations: Western Oil Shale Corporation, 
Cayman Corporation, and Royalty Invest-
ment Company. Defendant claimed that 
most of this stock belonged to Owanah, 
was not part of the marital estate, and, 
therefore, was not subject to the property 
division agreement 
H e Western Oil Shale Company stock 
was issued in 1964 in consideration for 
Owanah's interest in several oil shale leas-
es. Although defendant alleged that none 
of the parties' personal funds wee expend-
ed to squire these leases, he introduced no 
evidence beyond his testimony to that ef-
fect He also explained that the stock was 
issued in names other than Owanah's so 
that Owanah could sell it more easily by 
avoiding normal corporate fonnaJities, At 
the time of trial, he held at least 
al control but admitted ownership cf cnJy 
2^S6of them. 
Cayman stock had been issued by Cay-
man Corporation as consideration for stock 
in another closely held corporation, Nation-
al Oil Shale Corporation, and for an ofl and 
gas lease with a producing oil w e l De* 
fendant testified that both the National Oil 
Shale and Cayman shares were issued in 
his name for ease in sale and handling, but 
that he held them in trust for third parties. 
However, he introduced no evidence other 
than his testimony that there was an actual 
trust relationship between himself and oth-
ers. Part of the reason for his failure to 
introduce evidence was the lack of Cayman 
and National 00 Shale corporate records. 
At the time of trial, defendant held at least 
48,000 shares of Cayman stock in his name. 
At the time of the property settlement 
agreement, Royalty Investment Company 
owned, as its only major asset, the 
Anderson Ranch. At trial, defendant testi-
fied that Owanah and two other parties had 
made installment payments on the ranch 
and, thus, were entitled to 6 2 ^ of Royal-
ants earlier deposition contradicted this 
testimony, stating that he and plaintiff 
owned M of the Royalty stock. De-
fendant, in his personal financial state* 
meats, valued the ranch at between $250,. 
000 aod 11,000,000. 
In January 1982, Royalty sold the 
Anderson ranch for $250,000 and autho-
rized Owanah to use the proceeds. The 
only consideration which Royalty received 
for the proceeds was its choice between an 
interest-bearing loan and a # overriding 
royalty interest in Owanah. 
Defendant also claims that he made an 
oral accounting pursuant to the property 
settlement agreement with the law firm 
Roe and Fowler, and turned over to Roe 
and Fowler all stock certificates in the pu^ 
ties1 safe deposit box. Because plaintiff 
was not satisfied that there had been an 
adequate accounting under the terms of 
the property settlement agreement, she & 
sally brought this action on May 29,1380, 
to compel the accounting and judgment for 
any damages caused by defendant's delay 
in submitting the accounting. The purpose 
of the accounting was to identify the 
amount to which plaintiff was entitled u 
her share of the marital estate. 
Hie trial coort agreed that defendant 
had not made an adequate accounting, find-
ing that Owanah was defendant's alter ego 
even though this issue was not explicitly 
raised in the pleadings, l i e court also 
found that the assets subject to the ac-
counting were, in fact, owned by defend-
ant, and, pursuant to the terms of the 
settlement agreement, that plaintiff was 
entitled to one-half of those assets. How-
ever, because most of the assets had been 
sold by defendant, the court established a 
monetary value for the liquidated assets 
and included that amount as part of the 
marital estate to be distributed between 
theparties. Although this was an account-
ing action, the court ap(»opriately disposed-
of the assets according to the terms of the 
stipulated property settlement agreement 
without objection by either party. 
Defendant raises the following issues ofc 
appeal: (1) Was the a t e ego issue proper 
ego issue was 
MLMANv. 
Ott«WMK 
before the court, 
was 
court's finding that Owanah was defend-
anfsaitercgo! (3) Does applying the al-
ter ego doctrine effect a property distribo-
tioo cotitnry to t k parted property distri-
botia agreement! (4) Did the evidence, 
COLMAN Utah m 
that was tried inadvertently," MBI Motor 
to, 506 Fid at TIL 
requiring defendant to pay plaintiff an 
amount representing a parentage of the 
Anderson Ranch sale proceeds! (5) Is 
pbmtzff estopped from denying that de-
ing! 
I 
Under Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Gvi Procedure, issues not raised by the 
pleadings may be tried by the express or 
implied consent of the parties.1 l i e Utah 
Supreme Court has observed that issues 
consent to try an issue may be 
"where ooe party raises an issue 
material to the other party's case or wberr 
evidence is introduced without objection," 
06, where it aippeu(a} that the putiei 
amlentood the erideoee [wis] to be timed 
t t t h e m p b d e d i n K . " M Motor ( h 
506Fidttm. fcflntMyM 
of Utah t(Md Fori, Inc^fim 
859,861 (Utah 1379). 
Thos, the test for d e t e r w i g whether 
pleuSngs should be deemed amended un-
der Utah R.G?J> 15(b)»'whether t h e . 
opposing party had t fair opportunity to 
al eTidence if the cue wen retried oa *. 
different theory." UPoUCuuLC&i. 
fV« *n+aiMn/4ni/* miiutlr U/M iJ«~l W U A M tk* fe^i «mi*+f /ft Tf fktt «H»-' 
treated as if raised in the 
Therefore, "even failure to amend the 
pletdiags does not affect the result of the 
trial of these issues." GmrdluCcof 
i n . ii Curnicm Dynasty O p , 545 Pid 
502,506 (Utah 1976). 
[1] If a theory of recovery is fully tried 
by the parties, the court may base its deci-
tion on that theory and deem the pleadings 
amended, even if the theory was not origi-
nally pleaded or set forth in the pleadings 
or the pretrial order. MBI Motor Ok ft 
loto/East, fa, 506 F.2d 709,711 (6th 
Gr.1974). However, that the issue has, in 
fset, been tried, and that this procedure 
has been authorized by express or implied 
consent of the parties must be evident from 
therecord. (FtrfeftFJLSloan,Inc.,285 
P%669 ,675(WJ) .P i l968) . "Atrial 
court may not base its decision on an issue 
I Ottb R.OvJ». 15(b) (1977) reads u follows: 
Wbea issues not raised by the pleading ire 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
pcties, they shall be treated in all respects i s 
if they had been raised in the pleading* 
Sock amendment of the pleadings is maybe 
oecesary to cause tbeos to coofbrm to the 
evidence u d to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, 
even after judgment; but failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these 
Su also Omq t Sucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205,381 P-2d 86,91 (1963); ButhnerBbck 
O ) i f t ( ; ^ 6 U t a h 2 d 2 2 6 , 3 1 0 P i d 5 n , 
519-20(19571 
(21 In the present case, even though the 
alter ego issue was not specifically raisd 
in the pleadings, either initially or by 
amendment, the entire trial testimony con* 
ceraed defendant's control over the assets 
in question During trial, evidence con-
cerning every element of the alter ego is-
sue was introduced without objection. Fu> 
the?, the basic question raised in an alter 
ego case is whether the principal had per* 
sonal control over assets which he claimed 
to belong to the corporation. Since this 
question is the essential issue presented by 
this accounting action, we find that the 
parties received adequate notice of the at 
tar ego issue and an opportunity to meet it 
on the ground that it is not within the isaues 
made by the pleadings, the court may allow 
the pleadings to be amended when the p r t » 
tatioo of the merits of the actk» will be 
subserved thererjy tod the objecting party 
fails to satisfy the court that the admission of 
sud o i o ^ vaild prqudia him in m a ^ 
taining his action or defense upon the merits. 
The court shall grant i continuance, if aecef 
ary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
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Here w« no indication in the record that 
defendant ever represented to the court 
that he wis taken by surprise or wis other-
wise disadvantaged in meeting the alter 
egossue. SuQmciihdtT^im 
it 9L We find, therefore, that the alter 
ego issue wis property before the court 
n 
(Ml There is sufficient evidence to 
sustain the trial court's finding that Owsn-
ah wis defendant's alter ego. "Ordinarily, 
a corporation it regarded as a separate and 
<&tiKt legal ent^ r from its stodchoiders.1* 
ZTodbtobru ffdferf 29 Utah 2d 3709 510 
Pid 526,528 (1873). U s is tree whether 
the corporation has many stockholders or 
only one. fomq i Adams, 4 Kan. 
Appid 184, 603 Pid 1025, M (1979); 
Bm a Kim, 104 MichApp. 700,305 
N.W,2d 297,298 (1981). Consequently, the 
corporate veil which protects stockholders 
from individual liability will only be pierced 
reluctantly and cautiously, hrmj t 
erti lit % McDnlim (k 579 S l i d 
335,345(TetOvipp.lSf79). 
[5] To disregard the corporate entity 
under the eqmtabk alter ego doctrine, two 
circumstances must he shown: (1) Such a 
unity of interest and ownership that the 
separate personalities of the corporation 
and the izniiyiduai no long^ exist, bot the 
corporate is, instead, the alter ego of one 
or a few individuals; and (2) if observed, 
the corporate form would sanction a fraud, 
promote injustice, or result in an inequity. 
Nomon v. Jftirraj Firtt Tkrifl t Loan 
ft, 596 Pid 1028,1030 (Utah 1979). Ac-
cord UnM Stain v, Hedlkm-Midtom 
Convolmnt Hotp. wt RMlittfion 
Cent*, fe, 511 FSupp. 416 (CJ).CaE 
1981). fccfoCfsAmGnpa/^ 
dm, 1st, 562 Pid 1252,1253 (Utah 
mDochtadtriWo!ktr,WMtt 
1 Failure to obxrc corporate formalitio in* 
dudes ttd activities t$ coauDeaccnent of hus-
oes without the isoaoce of sham, lack of 
shareholders' or directors' meetings, lack of 
370,510 Pid 526,528(1973); Geary* 
Cm, 79 Utah 268,9 Pid 396,398 (1932). 
It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove 
actual fraud, hut must wily show that h&> 
are to pierce the corporate veil would i* 
suit in an injustice. Hcdikm-Midiovn 
Conwlaxnt Hotp, 511 FJkpp. it 420. 
[6,7] Certain factors which are deemed 
significant, although not coochsive, in de-
termining whether this test has been met 
include: (1) undercapitalization of a one* 
man corporation; (2) fake to observe cor» 
by suRaoiden as if they wot partner Rof 
la, he f, hnpm Bm. CowfrA 5S5 S.W M 
76S,772(TaCivipp.l979). 
idends; (4) siphoning of corporate funds by 
the dominant stockholder; (5) nonfunction 
ing of other officers or directors; (6) ah* 
sence of corporate records; (7) the use of 
the corporation as a facade for operations 
of the dominant stockholder or stockhold-
ers;1 and (8) the use of the corporate enti-
ty in promoting injustice or fraud, jfaflt* 
*y I?. Adams, 603 Pid at 1028; Amoco 
Omvxls ftrp. a Sac*, 222 Kan. 589, 
567 Pid 1337,134W2 (1977). Setfa 
fanimt WW#^514F.Supp.759, 
76JW4 (Ofarto Rico 1981k JfaflMfr 
Midtom Convalactnt Hos^ 511 Fiiupp. 
a t 4 1 W 9 ; M m a n & M * 3 5 1 S o i d 
210,213-14 (Laipp.1977). 
[81 The rationale used by courts in per-
mitting the corporate vol to be pierced % 
that if a principal shareholder or owner 
conducts his private and corporate business 
on an interchangeable or joint basis u if 
they were one, he is without standing to 
complain when an injured party does the 
same. Bone Constt Co. a Lewit, 148 
Gaipp.61,250SI2d851,853(1978), In 
Lyons v. Lyons, 340 Soid 450,451 (Alt 
Civipp.1976), the court stated that 1a] 
court of equity looks through form to sub* 
stance and has oftoi disregarded the corpo* 
rate form when it was fiction in fact and 
deed and was merely serving the personal 
use and convenience of the owner.'* lte 
I Fiilure to distinguish between corpon&e aod 
personal property, the use of corporate funis to 
pty penooal expenses without proper aocoffli* 
i i^i idf i i iurctomiint imco^ 
tad financial records are looked upon with <* 
treme disfavor. Rofa 5S5 i W 2i at 772. 
UlLMANv.COUUN 
Ifts court found a corporation to be a account Although he stated that this <* 
shareholder's alter ego, even though he cmred because the bank initiaQy preferred 
owned only one share of stock, because he to ded personally with the p r i z ^ l^ 
eoomingled corporate fonds with his own, cause of Owanah's small net worth, he also 
kept no regular corporate records, meet- continued this practice weO after Owanah 
ipgs, or mimites tside fmtn a bank account, acquired substutal sssets, becaose, as he 
and (fid not file corporate income tax re- stated, adjustments m loans and sales of 
tarns. See Standee a Standee, 147 stock could be made without time<onsum-
Ariaipp. 473,711 Pid 612,614-15 (1985). ing corporate resolutions. 
[9] Former spouses attempting to & September 17, 1976, defendant 
shield sssets ftom a courtnriered property pledged 5 0 ^ shares of Western 02 Shale 
(fttrilmtion by using a corporate form are rtod and 48,000 shares of Cayman stock to 
especiaOy kwked upon with judicial disfa- First Security Bank as collateral for bans 
mfeflmtys&stalflAriL to Owanah. He testified that this stock 
App. 473,711 Pid 612 (1985); Colandm W <*&*&! * « awed in his, his broth-
n CWmtfm; 401 Aid 480 (HdCtSpec er's, and his broker's names, rather than in 
Appj979), Owanah's name, so that corporate format 
T *L * n ij.1 -k ties could be avoided in seQmg the stock. 
In the present case, the trial court con-
 ni_ . . , . , « - « , . , . 
ndend tte evidence in the light of tte Between September 17,1978, and Febnury 
-LA. A '2*4 v j • A shares of Cayman stock m ha personal 
exsts such a unity of ownership and mter- ' £ 
est between defendant and Owanah Ofl " - P ^ T * M t a f 
(irimtionthatttesejarate,^ ^ ^ f ^ ^ j S " ^ of the corporation and the individual no 
longer exist," and (2) to recognize such 
separate personalities "would promote in-
justice and an inequitable result" 
rized by his signature without any sugges-
tion that he TSS acting on behalf of as/vnj§ 
else. 
First Security Bank released the 48,000 
„ ]
 n. .. shares of Cayman stock and 47,820 sham 
For purposes of appellate review, the
 t.. m / M . . A , . .. . 
AJ.I V J •• • it i of the Western Ofl Shale stock to defend-
tnai court's deaswn to pierce the corporate 
refl will be upheld if there • substantial f " ^ ? ? " " ^ 
.. • / / i t • J * oi J this stock as bemg defendants personal 
evidence m favor of the judgment Stand- ^_. .
 A * . . .. V x L 
m HI Pid at 0 4 4 An exaction ^ J M J " ^ M ^ • 
of the present trial record indicate that ^ d e n n n t y a ^ e n t t o ^ 
L. , A . . ., . bank from any claim raised by plaintiff 
there was substantial evidence supporting . , . ' r 
the trial court's finding that the separate ^ ^ 
personalities of Owanah and defendant no 
longer existed. 
First, defendant ignored corporate for-
malities. He stated that he preferred to 
conduct corporate business personally, 
rather than in the corporate name, because 
it was more convenient than observing ap» 
pnpriaie corporate procedures, and re-
peatedly did so. 
Defendant testified that this stock, val-
ued by the trial court at $14i5 per share, 
was later sold to fund one of Owanah's 
projects, and that the proceeds from this 
sale were deposited in Owanah's account 
However, payments for defendant's resi-
dential mortgage, light and utility bills 
were also made directly from Owanah's 
account, as were numerous cash payments 
to defendant, totalling $22,695i5 within a 
Second, defendant failed to distinguish twelve month period To help SnaDce Ow 
bet^corporateandpersonalprop^
 rfg ^ ^ M^t ^ ^ ^ 
hs business dealings. the parties' Park Citj residence for m * 
In correspondence with First Security 000, applied part of the imceeds to a reduc* 
Bank, defendant continually referred to the (ion of Owanah's debt, and deposited the 
Owanah checking aceonnt « M« r*w*n««i .'-J— :_ n u . 
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•uv n u f i i w was utvt «&w»v y*] "•*"" UHWJ 
on his behalf by Owanah as repayment by 
Owanah of this mortgage. Further, de-
fendant presented no evidence at trial that 
he oamtamed any peno&il dieddng ic^ 
count apart from Owanah's. Personal and 
corponte tf&irs appear to be iaeitricibly 
interwoven 
Thai the other officers and directors 
played little, if any, role in the operation of 
defendant's corporate entities. Defendant 
produced no evidence at trial, other than 
his testimony, to indicate that others had 
tsy interest in Owtnah, although the trial 
judge requested such evidence on several 
occasions dnring the trial and the trial was 
recessed for defendant to provide it 
Fourth, there was an almost complete 
failure to keep and maintain corporate 
records. There was DO evidence that 
shareholder records were kept for Cayman 
Corporation, even though such records 
were repeatedly requested by plaintiffs 
counsel and the trial judge, and defendant 
was even given an opportunity by the court 
to find and present thesL Defendant was 
similarly unable to produce any records 
which showed shareholders, bylaws, or fi-
nancial status of Royalty Investment Cor-
poration. Defendant claimed that Owanah 
owned Cayman stock as weB as proceeds 
from the sale of the Anderson Ranch, 
which was owned by Royalty Investment 
Corporation. 
Fifth, there is evidence that Owanah and 
the other corporate shells were used as a 
facade for defendants personal business 
operations. The most significant evidence 
was the method in which the Anderson 
Ranch sale was consummated. After the 
property settlement agreement had been 
entered, Royalty Investment Corporation 
sold the ranch, using no corporate formali-
ties, and then deposited the sale proceeds 
in Owanah's bank account for a # over-
riding royalty interest in the Owanah 
project Plaintiff alleged that this wss no 
consideration at a l Although the transac-
tion was ratified by Royalty on tie advice 
of counsel eleven months after the sale and 
three days before trial, such a ratification 
macy. Since defendants not proffer tes-
timony at trial of anyone other than hi* 
self, purporting to have an interest in Roy-
alty, Owanah, or the Anderson Ranch, it i 
diffieok to fiew this traastetkm u iti|u 
thing bnta pemcal tnnsactioQ dooei©. 
der a corporate aegis. Tins, defendant's 
equivocal testimony regarding the m * 
ship of the Anderson Ranch, coupled with 
the lack of substantial evidence that Owan-
ah gave valuable consideration for the pro* 
ceeds of the Anderson Ranch sale, supports 
a finding that the corporate shells were 
used as a facade for the transfer of p n ^ 
ty from a corporate shell that pkmtiff had 
some interest in to one in which she had 
less interest 
Further, defendant's use of Owanah to 
receive the proceeds from the sale of the 
Cayman and Western Oil Company stock, 
coupled with his use of Owanah's account 
to pay his personal living expenses, sug-
gest that defendant was using Owanah u 
a facade for his personal affairs. 
Finally, the use of the corporate entity in 
this circumstance would result in injustice. 
If viewed as legitimate corporate transac* 
business transactions would convert sub* 
stantial assets, which otherwise would be 
regarded as marital property, to corporate 
assets in which plaintiff had no interest 
Such shielding of assets would result in a 
great injustice to plaintiff. 
Therefore, we find that there was sub* 
stantial evidence before the trial court to 
support its finding that defendant's corpo-
rations were actually his alter ego. 
HI 
Because application of the alter ego do* 
trine is justified, we reach the issue of 
whether the property division by the trial 
court is in harmony with the parties' pity* 
erty settlement agreement Defendant ar-
gues that the property division resulting, 
from the alter ego finding is contrary to, 
the intent of the property settlement agi*'< 
ment because it awards plaintiff more thiii^ 
half of the marital estate, and, thus, is ss"; 
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(101 In the division of marital property, corporation fonned during their marriage, 
the trial court has wide discretion, and, He alleged that a corporation which the 
while the appellate court is not necessarily trial court had determined to be his person-
bound by its findings, Jhmfm t al, premarital property had loaned S69t000 
Jtowpsw, 709 Pid 350,361-62 (Utah to a corporation which he and his wife 
1885), the findings are presumed valid and formed during the marriage. Because he 
fjQ not be disturbed unless the record indi- "utterly failed to prove that the loan did 
cates such a manifest injustice or inequity indeed exist," in that he could produce no 
as to indicate a dear abuse of discretion, papers documenting the loan, any terms, 
EomiEam^WPid395,397(Utah conditions of repayment, or interest, and 
CtApp.1987); Ptttrm t Pttem, 737 because the trial court expressly found 
Pid 237,239 (Utah CtApp.1987). Regard* that he had commingled corporate and per-
ing challenges to property distributions, sonal funds throughout the marriage so 
the Utah Supreme Court has stated that that it could not trace any assets to any 
a party seeking reversal of the trial court source, the court found that he had failed 
mustproveamisuBdentandingormisap- to carry his burden of proof. Ii at 119. 
plication of the law resulting in substan-
tial and prejudicial error, or that the evi- Wl S " H & *e present defendant 
dence clearly preponderated against the has Med to carry his burden of proof that 
findings, or that such a serious inequity the disputed assets are corporate rather 
resulted from the order as to constitute ^ F*®^ P 1 0 ? ^ so we find no 
an abuse of the trial courfs discretion, abuse of discretion in the trial court's prop-
m^tMSm^mmmm erty division resulting from appiicataoo of 
(Utah 1979). That the property (fistribution 
may not have been mathematically equal is 
not sufficient grounds to constitute an 
abuse of discretion, since a fair and eq-
the alter ego theory. 
Defendant further argues that the trial 
uitable property distribution is not neces- court's order requiring him to pay plainti 
sarJy an equal distribution. Suftetdur
 m mmi ^^^ a p ^ t ^ 0f 
^ ^ , 6 1 5 Pid 1218,1223-24 (Utah the price of the Anderson Ranch sale pro-
^ ceeds is without support in the findigs, 
Further, it is well recognized that a par- conclusions, or evidence. We reiterate that 
ties' stipulation as to property rights in a the trial judge has wide discretion in the 
divorce action, although advisory and division of marital property, and his find-
usually followed unless the court finds it to ings will not be disturbed by an appellate 
be unfair or unreasonable, is not necessar- court unless the record shows a clear abuse 
ily binding on the trial court It is only a of discretion. Hie Utah Supreme Court 
recommendation to be adhered to if the has stated, in PtanontPtamn, 561 Pid 
court believes it to be fair and reasonable. 
Pwrwn v. Panon, 561 Pid 1080,1082 
(Utah 1977); KMmMulk Pid 472, 
476 (Utah 1975). Hus, even if the trial 
court does not exactly follow the parties' 
agreement, such a decree is still within the 
trial courfs reasonable discretion. 
The Utah Supreme Court has previously 
opheld a trial courfs property division un-
der somewhat similar circumstances. In 
h q i F u t l , 728 Pid 117 (Utah 1986), 
the defendant husband appealed from the 
portion of a divorce decree awarding the 
at 1082, that 
in regard to the matter of the sufficien-
cy of fiiniinp of facU substantial com-
pliance with Rule 52, Utah Rules of CM 
Procedure, is sufficient, and findinp of 
fact and conclusions of law will support a 
judgment, though they are very general, 
where they in most respects follow the 
allegation of the pleadings. Findings 
should be limited to the ultimate facts 
and if they ascertain ultimate facts, and 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and 
the evidence to support the judgment, 
tit** «ni k* »JLA 
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though not as full and as complete u 
might be desired. 
fi(wew,^detomineif€qaitywi8(k^ 
we most have before uaipedfcfindingiof 
fict pertinent to tiat kroe." h m t 
CUpp.1887). 
[12] In the present case, tfae trial court 
s p e c M y f o m K l t k t l i j t t l i e t i ^ o f t k 
ptrtief' lgreeoeit, ind until the property 
was sold is January 1382, defendant held 
title to 62*A% interest in the ranch through 
Royalty Investaent Company, The ranch 
•as sold for $250,000.00 in January 1982, 
and the accounting shows that (fefendant is 
indebted to plaintiff in the amount of $78t-
125,00,whichis31i5?tof»50,fl0fl.r It 
is the trial judge's prerogative, not an 
abuse of discretion, to choose to disbelieve 
defendant explanation of this property in* 
terest Tiere was evidence in the record to 
support such a finding, which is sufficient 
to come within the guidelines outlined by 
Farm and Jom 
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's 
award with respect to the Andmon Ranch 
property. 
Defendant's final issue raised on appeal 
is whether plaintiff was estopped from de-
nying that he furnished an adequate ac-
counting, He alleges that he made an oral 
accounting to the law firm of Roe and 
Fowler and turned over to Roe and Fowler 
all the stock certificates in the parties' safe 
deposit box. Roe and Fowler later re-
turned some of these certificates to defoxt 
ant Defendant argues that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon express <y implied 
representations that the accounting was 
satisfactory because defendant made no 
further demand for an accounting after 
this event However, the document which 
defendant received from Roe and Fowler 
when it returned the coiificates wis only 
an acknowledgement that the shares were 
delivered into his control as president of 
Qwanah, rather than a release or exclusion 
of the shires from an ereototl accounting. 
continual contact with defendant concern, 
ing his failure to mike the accounting aod 
had brought a prior lawsuit against defead-
ant to enforce the divorce decree m i 
agreement Finally, plaintiff stated thtf 
she was totally without knowledge of the 
business affairs concerning the disputed 
assets. 
[13,14] Estoppel arises when there is 
(1) a false representation or cooceahnert of 
material fads; (2) made with knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of the facts; (J) 
made to a party who is without knowledge 
or the means of knowledge of the m l 
facts; (4) made with the intention that the 
representation be acted upon; and (5) the 
party to whom the representation wis 
made relied or acted upon it to his preju-
dke. M y t f . M a n ^ 9 5 U t a h 5 6 0 , 8 8 
Pid 731,734 (1938); iforjan & 5ooni (^ 
See dso City of Mercer liknd a SUi* 
^na,9WaslLApp.479,513PidS0,8 
(1973). If any of these elements an ma* 
ing, there can be no estoppel Kittf a 
£ M 8 3 P i d a t 7 3 4 . Further, estop, 
pel cannot be inferred from facts of wind 
the party to be estopped had no knowledge. 
(Trover u C i^m, 23 Utah 2d 441^  464 P^d 
598,602(1970). 
[15] Estoppel is not applicable under 
the present facta 
The judgment of the trial court is if* 
firmed. Costs to plaintiff, 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, fl, 
concur. 
(o taiMNrc**) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
T. 
bbert HOLYOAK, Defendant 
and Appellant 
N0.8W2M-CA. 
Conrt of Appeals of UtaL 
Oct 14 m . 
STATE T. HOLYOAK Utah 791 
Police, relying oa information provided 
by a confidential informant, obtained a 
search warrant to search Hop/oak's premi-
es forcocaine. As a result of the search, 
they found a small plastic big containing 
cocaine hidden under HoJyoak's water bed 
Prior to trial, flotyoak moved to suppress 
the admission of the cocaine on pounds 
that the confidential informant's veracity 
and basis of knowledge were inadequate, 
that corroboration of his information was 
defective, as was the police affidavit based 
on the informant's testimony, and, there-
Defendant was chargri with p ^ fore, that there wis insufficwxt pn*abk 
w o f c o o m e l i e District Court Utah cause to issue the search warrant Holy-
Comrt79 Ksy H. Htrdm;, J^ denied defend- oak moved altoBitiweJy for dkdosnre of 
aotft pretrkl motioQ to soppras and al> the informant's identity or for the court to 
lowed introduction of cocaine into evidence coriud an in w m m interview of the 
and defendant was subsequently convicted WoniMt on the theory that to was, in 
Defendant appealed. Hie Court of Ap- reality, no confidential informant, but that 
peals, Garft J^ held that defendant failed the police officer had fehricated the affida-
to object to admissibility of cocaine evi- vit and had planted the cocaine. 
A suppression heart? was held, and 
even though testimony indicated that some 
of the allegations in the police affidavit 
were false, the trial court denied afl of 
Holyoak's motions. Regarding the motion 
to suppress, the trial court stStted that the 
affidavit, viewed in its entirety, supported 
the issuance of the search warrant 
At trial, the cocaine was introduced into 
denes at trial, and hence, could not raise 
issue on 
Criminal Law <=W1(3) 
Defendant failed to object to admissi-
bility of cocaine evidence at trial, and 
hence, he could not raise on appeal issue 
challenging denial of motion to suppress, evidence. Holyoak did not object to its 
introduction, and ^ was convicted by a jury 
of possession of cocaine. 
On appeal, Holyoak raises substantially 
the same issues as in the evidentiary hear* 
ing: (1) Should the cocaine obtained pursu-
James G. Clark Provo, for defendant 
and appellant 
David L Wilkinson, State Atty. Gen., 
Sandra L Sjogren, Asst Atty, Gen, for ant to the search warrant have been sup-
plaintiff and respondent 
Before G A M , BILLINGS and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARPF, Judge: 
pressed on grounds that there was no prob-
able cause to support the search warrant? 
(2) Alternatively, should the trial court 
have ordered disclosure of the identity of 
the confidential informant! (3) As a fur-
ther alternative to suppressing the evi-
dence or disclosing the identity of the infor-
mant, should the court have conducted an 
m canm interview of the informant? 
bis conviction of possession of cocaine, a Our review of these questions, however, 
-thW degree felony, on the grounds that depends upon whether these issues were 
the tzisl court failed to suppress evidence preserved for appeal Although Holyoak 
f a n a l W y moved to suppress the cocaine prior to tri-
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of the contrary view taken by my four col-
leagues, I suppose it can reasonably be 
said that there is at least some doubt that 
the statute should be construed and applied 
as I have stated above. If that be so, then 
under the rule which requires taxing stat-
utes to be interpreted and applied liberally 
in favor of the taxpayer and strictly against 
the taxing authority, the issue can be re-
solved in favor of the plaintiff. 
It seems to me unfair and inequitable 
that Utah should bear the entire cost of the 
cooperative examination by giving the tax-
payer credit against its tax, when its bene-
fits also have value to the other states par-
ticipating in the examination* In view of 
the decision of the majority, if the situa-
tion is changed, it must be done by legis-
lation* 
13 Utah 2d 279 
Keith B. ELLIS et al- Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
v. 
Karl B. HALE et aU Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 9537. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 12, 1962. 
Action for damages arising out of 
real estate transactions. From an order of 
the Third District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Ray Van Cott, Jr., J., dismissing 
vendees' second amended complaint with 
prejudice, vendees appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Callister, J., held that vendors' ex-
hibition of unapproved subdivision plat to 
vendees, without informing vendees that 
such plat had not been approved, was not 
negligent misrepresentation, and complaints 
of vendees were insufficient to maintain 
claims that vendors induced the purchase 
of the lots in question by fraudulently mis-
representing that the plat had been ap-
proved and recorded, or that insurer neg-
ligently failed to disclose the fact that prop-
erties involved were not approved building 
lots. 
Affirmed. 
1. Negligence <&=>6 
In some instances, negligence may be 
predicated upon violation of an ordinance 
or statute. 
2. Municipal Corporations <§=>43 
Statutes making it unlawful for anyone 
to sell a subdivision lot unless subdivision 
plat has been approved and recorded impose 
*a duty running to the sovereign, and viola-
tion thereof does not necessarily give rise 
to civil liability. U.CJU953, 17-27-21, 57-
5-5. 
3. Fraud <§=>27 
Vendors' exhibition of unapproved 
subdivision plat to vendees without inform-
ing them that such plat had not been ap-
proved was not negligent misrepresentation! 
U.C.A.1953, 17-27-21, 57-5-5. 
4. Fraud <§=»4 
Usual action for fraud, whether negli-
gent or intentional, requires that a reprer 
sentatiorr be made with the intention that 
it be relied on. 
5. Fraud <§=>I3(3) 
Negligent misrepresentation differs 
from intentional misrepresentation in that 
in the former the representor makes an af-
firmative assertion which is false without 
having used reasonable diligence or compe-
tence in ascertaining the verity of the as-
sertion. . » 
6. Fraud <§=>I3(3) 
Liability will only lie for a negligent 
misrepresentation when there is a special 
duty of care running from the representor 
to the representee. 
7. Fraud <§=>I3(3) 
There can be no liability for negligence 
in the manner of expression. 
8. Fraud <§=»42 
Complaint which did not show that 
vendor, who made alleged misrepresenta-
ELLIS v. HALE Utah 383 
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o another, intended that such misrep- l4- Covenants <3=>3 
itions would be transmitted to ven- Warranties, other than the five em-
as insufficient to state cause of action braced in the statutory warranty deed, 
mdulent misrepresentations. U.C.A. should be stated in a deed with clarity. 
7-27-21, 57-5-5. 
Adam M. Duncan, Ronald N. Boyce, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
Hanson, Baldwin & Allen, Backman, 
Backman & Clark, Salt Lake City, for re-
spondents. 
CALLISTER, Justice. 
Action for damages arising out of cer-
tain real estate transactions. From an or-
der of the lower court dismissing their 
second amended complaint, with prejudice, 
plaintiffs appeal. 
The complaint which we are asked to re-
view is rather lengthy and complex, to say 
the least. As best we can determine, the 
facts alleged are as follows: 
The defendants Hale, Elders and Fisher 
were the owners of a certain parcel of 
real property in Salt Lake County. In the 
forepart of 1959, these defendants caused 
the parcel to be surveyed and subdivided 
into four lots.1 A subdivision plat was pre-
pared, designated as "Mount Olympus Park 
No. 5." The plat was submitted to the 
Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning 
Commission who refused to approve and ac-
cept it because there had not been com-
pliance with a county ordinance relating 
to subdividing which requires lots of a larg-
er area, installation of curbs, gutters, side-
walks, etc2 There is a general allegation 
that all of the defendants were acting as 
partners or joint adventurers in these real 
estate transactions and all had knowledge 
of the rejection of the subdivision plan. 
It is also alleged that "during the spring 
of 1959" the defendants Hale, Elders and 
Fisher conveyed to defendants Barrett 
three lots identified upon the subdivision 
plat as Lots 1, 2 and 3, and that "in July 
id <§=>29 
a person fraudulently makes a mis-
entation of facts to another with the 
that it will be transmitted to a third 
, the latter may have cause of action 
t the misrepresentor. 
tud <£=**! 
raudulent misrepresentation com-
which did not reveal any allegation 
.representation made to vendees was 
aent. 
stud <§=>46 
laim by vendees, against insurers for 
ence in failing to disclose that insured 
ere in unapproved subdivision failed 
complaint contained no allegation 
isurers knew that vendees were acting 
impression that lots were within ap-
i subdivision, 
sadlng <8=>354<22) 
laim by vendees, who purchased lots 
L in unapproved subdivision plat, that 
was breach of provisions of title in-
:e policy issued by insurers was prop-
lismissed where the policy was not 
ned in the record and the particular 
>ion or provisions claimed to have 
^reached were not set out in the com-
. U.C.A.1953, 17-27-21, 57-5-5; 
of Civil Procedure, rule 8(a). 
>venants <8»I7, M4(!) 
Ascription of land by the word "lot" 
3t indicate a promise of vendors that 
lots were in approved subdivision, and 
that there was breach of warranty 
e failed where complaint contained no 
tion that sale of lot in unapproved 
rision was prohibited by law. U.C.A. 
17-27-21, 57-5-5. 
appears from the record and the 
aplaint, however, that in October, 1958, 
Hales had evidently divided the par-
• because they executed separate deeds, 
four in all, to Elders, Fishers, and two 
others to portions of the parcel. 
2. Title 9, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, 1953. 
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and August 1959" the Barretts conveyed, ' 
by warranty deeds, these three lots to the 
plaintiffs Duncan. 
Following the foregoing, the complaint 
alleges that on July 7, 1959, the defendants 
Hale and Elders conveyed, by warranty 
deed, Lot 1 to the Duncans, and on the same 
date, the Hales and the defendants Fisher, 
by like conveyance, conveyed Lot 2 to the 
Duncans, By warranty deed, dated August 
7, 1959, the Hales and Barretts conveyed 
Lot 3 to the Duncans.3 These last three 
mentioned deeds described the property 
conveyed by lot number and by metes and. 
bounds* The metes and bounds descriptions 
coincided with the lots as they appeared on 
the plat. No mention of "Mount Olympus 
Park No. 5" was contained in these deeds* 
On January 27, 1960, 'the defendants 
Elders executed a warranty deed to the 
plaintiffs Ellis. While this deed did not 
contain a lot number, the metes and bounds 
description conformed to Lot 4 of the sub-
division plot. 
The Duncans "conveyed or agreed to 
convey" their interest in the lots to the 
plaintiffs Hepworth and Burton, _but" are 
unable to complete the conveyance because 
of defendants' noncompliance with the ordi-
nance. It is then alleged that the impos-
sibility of securing building permits from 
the county has caused plaintiffs damage. 
The complaint sets forth eight claims, 
revolving about essentially five asserted 
causes of action. These causes are: (1) 
defendants were negligent in violating a 
statutory standard of care and in exhib-
iting or causing to be exhibited to plain-
tiffs the subdivision plat without inform-
ing them that it had not been approved; (2) 
defendants induced the purchase of the lots 
3« While impossible of precise ascertainment 
from the allegations of the complaint, it 
is a reasonable inference that these deeds 
were later in time than the deeds from 
the Barretts to the Duncans. 
4. It is doubtful that this ordinance has any 
application since it defines "subdivision" 
as a division of a tract of land into five 
or more lots. (9-1-2, Rev.Ord.SX.Co., 
by fraudulently misrepresenting that the 
plat had been approved and recorded; (3) 
defendants Backman negligently failed to 
disclose the fact that the properties involved 
were not approved building lots; (4) the 
title insurance policy was bleached; an<J 
(5) there was a breach of the warranty of 
title. 
[1,2] (1) Plaintiffs argue that the de-
fendants, in selling the lots, violated the 
provisions of the county ordinance 4 afore? 
mentioned and our state statutes.5 It is true 
that in some instances negligence may be 
predicated upon the violation of an ordi-
nance or statute.6 However, the laws htri 
involved have as their object the intelli-
gent and orderly development of the con£ 
munity, and, to effectuate this purpose} 
criminal sanctions were imposed* They 
were not enacted to promote safety, an4 
they do not attempt to lay down rujejj 
regulating the conduct of individuals ixfr 
ter se. Their purpose is to impose, a.di^ tjf 
running to the sovereign, and a violation; 
thereof does not necessarily give rise,^ 
civil liability, 
[3] With respect to the claim that the 
defendants exhibited or caused to beve2&j 
hibited the plat without informing plain^ 
tiffs that it had not • been approved^ the 
plaintiffs maintain that this amounted to a, 
negligent misrepresentation. This clainj 
was properly dismissed The gravamen^ 
the claim is that defendants are liable fog 
negligently using a mode of communication 
which they ought to have foreseen, woul# 
be interpreted by the plaintiffs as an indi-
cation that the lots involved were a l>art 
of an approved subdivision. 
bib 
[4-6] The usual action for - fraudt 
whether negligent or intentional, requires, 
1953). The instant tract was divided into^  . j s 
only four lots. 
5. 17-27-21 and 57-5-5, TJ.OA.1953. These-^ 
statutes make it unlawful; and provide'a 
misdemeanor penalty for anyone selling 
a subdivision lot unless* the subdivision •*, 
has been approved and recorded r tAO * 
6. cf. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn1 Schoof -
Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 177 P.2d 279. "a"* 
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[8,9] (2) Plaintiffs contend that their 
complaint states a cause of action based 
upon fraudulent misrepresentation in that 
the defendants exhibited or caused to be 
exhibited to plaintiffs the subdivision plat 
and represented to them that it had been 
approved although they knew otherwise. 
However, it is specifically alleged that the 
defendant Karl B. Hale made the mis-
representation to the defendant, Roy A. 
Barrett, and that the latter repeated the 
same to plaintiff, Adam A. Duncan, If a 
person fraudulently makes a misrepresenta-
tion of facts to another with the intent that 
it will be transmitted to a third person, the 
latter may have a cause of action against 
the misrepresentor.10 The instant com-
plaint fails to allege that Hale intended 
the misrepresentation to be transmitted 
to Duncan or anyone else and must, there-
fore, fail. 
[10] The claim of fraud by plaintiffs 
Ellis must also fail. They received their 
deed directly from the Elders. A search of 
the complaint fails to reveal any allegation 
of a misrepresentation made to them. 
[11] (3) Plaintiffs Burton contend 
that the Backmans, in issuing to them an 
"interim insurance binder" and title in-
surance policy, were negligent in failing 
to disclose in these instruments the fact, 
of which the Backmans had knowledge, 
that the lots were located in a disapproved 
subdivision. The complaint contains no 
allegation that the Backmans knew that 
the Burtons were acting under an im-
pression that the lots were within an ap-
proved subdivision and the Backmans had 
no duty to reveal facts outside the scope 
of the transaction. The lower court prop-
erly dismissed this claim. 
[12] (4) The Burtons also claim that 
there was a breach of the provisions of the 
title insurance policy issued by the Back-
mans. The policy is not contained in the 
t a representation be made with the in-
tion that it be relied on.7 Negligent 
representation differs from intentional 
representation in that in the former the 
resentor makes an affirmative assertion 
ch is false without having used rea-
able diligence or competence in ascer-
ing the verity of the assertion.8 More-
r, liability will only lie for a negligent 
representation when there is a special 
y of care running from the representor 
he representee.9 
7] In plaintiffs' complaint it is specifi-
y alleged that the defendants had knowl-
e of the falsity of the supposed repre-
tation that induced the belief that the 
were part of an approved subdivision. 
conclude that this knowledge fore-
>es an action for negligent misrepre-
tation, unless it can be said that de-
iants might be liable for the manner 
Jieir communication, rather than in the 
srtainment of the verity of the com-
iication. Under the facts of this case, 
such liability can be recognized. The 
ties were dealing at arm's length, 
•e was no special duty between them 
ing out of a special expertise or corn-
ice on the part of one of the par-
, and the plaintiffs could have very 
ly cleared up whatever ambiguity or 
Ivocalness there was in the communi-
ons by the easy expedient of a simple 
stion. The inherent ambiguity of most 
ns of communication compel us to the 
elusion that usually, as a matter of law, 
e can be no liability for negligence in 
.manner of expression. Obviously, if 
erson intentionally uses equivocal or 
>iguous language with the hope that 
1 of several meanings will be under-
do by the representee, an entirely dif-
nt situation would be presented. But, 
e these facts are not pleaded, we need 
address ourselves to that problem. 
31ar v. Bd. o£ Trade, 164 CaLApp.2d 636, 
31 P.2d 89; Courteen Sud Co. v. Hong 
o^ng & Shanghai Bkg. Corp., 245 N.Y. 
77, 157 N.E. 272, 56 A.L.R. 1186. 
373 p 2d—25 
8. 1 Harper & James, the Law of Torts, 
Sec. 7.6. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Rest of Torts, Section 533. 
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record before us, and the particular provi-
sion or provisions claimed to have been 
breached are not set out in the complaint 
This claim does not meet the requirements 
of our rules 1X and was properly dismissed. 
• [13] (5) Finally, the Duncans contend 
that there was a breach of warranty of ti-
tle in the deeds received by them to Lots 1, 
2 and 3. It is alleged that the parties to 
these deeds understood the word "lot" to 
mean building lots in an approved subdivi-
sion. The lots were conveyed by use of the 
short form warranty deed.~ In their brief 
the Duncans argue that the warranties of 
good right to convey and seisin were breach-
ed. Whatever force this argument may 
have, by virtue of the fact that Section 17-
27-21, U.CA.1953 prohibits the sale of 
lots in an unapproved subdivision, it is not 
properly before the court since the com-
plaint contains no allegation to that ef-
fect. In fact, the*, complaint does not rely 
on any of the five warranties embraced in 
the statutory warranty deed. 
• [14] Duncans' theory apparently is that 
by using the word "lot" the defendants 
warranted that the properties were part of 
an approved, subdivision. This is not sus-
tainable. Warranties, other than the five 
embraced in a statutory warranty deed, 
should be stated in a deed with clarity. 
Description of land by the use of the word 
"lot" does not indicate a promise on the 
part of the defendant vendors in this case. 
Although such a description might possibly 
be probative of fraud, it cannot as a mat-
ter of law be considered a warranty. These 
claims were properly dismissed. 
No discussion is contained in this opin-
ion with regard to the possible claims 
against the defendants Barrett. It ap-
pears from the record that no appearance 
was made by them in the court below or in 
this court. 
The order of dismissal with prejudice is 
affirmed. Costs awarded to defendants. 
WADE, C. J., and HENRIOD, McDON-
OUGH, and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
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Paul RUBEY and Carol Rubey, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Morris T, WOOD and Ruby J. Wood, his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
No. 9447. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 20, 1962. 
Action for specific performance of real 
estate contract. The Third District Court'; 
Salt Lake County, Aldon J. Anderson, J., 
rendered judgment on directed verdict foe 
plaintiffs, and defendants appealed. The,' 
Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that 
evidence was insufficient to take to jury 
question whether defendants had been jus* 
tified in relying on plaintiffs' oral represen-
tations as to contents of contract 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <§=>987(3) 
Supreme Court had duty to review both" 
questions of law and fact in equitable easel 
2. Contracts <&=>99(3) 
To overturn written contract by claim' 
of fraud and misrepresentation, evidence^  
must be clear and convincing. 
3. Appeal and Error <§=>l 012(1) 
For defendants to succeed on appeal* 
from judgment denying their claim of fraudf 
and misrepresentation, evidence must clears? 
ly preponderate against trial courr/s decit* 
sion. 
4. Specific Performance <§=>I23 
Evidence, in action for specific" per" 
formance of real estate contract, wherein, 
defendants charged fraud and misrepresent 
tation, was insufficient to take to jury ques5^ 
tion whether defendants had been justified; 
in relying on plaintiffs' oral representations, 
as to contents of contract. 
Cayias, Day & Livingston, Salt Lake 
City, for appellants. 
II. UJt.C.P. 8(a). 
